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Abstract
Introduction: The presence of errors in the preanalytical phase is a thoroughly studied problem. A strategy to increase their source de-
tection might be the use of the Healthcare Failure Mode and  Effects Analysis (HFMEA). The aim of this study is improving the capacity of 
identifying sources of error during the preanalytical period in samples provided by primary care clinics (PCC) with the use of the HFMEA as 
a tool in the laboratories of two tertiary hospitals. 
Materials and methods: A HFMEA was carried out in each laboratory, by means of the creation of groups of experts with similar cha-
racteristics (doctors and nurses from PCC and laboratory, support staff, and laboratory technicians). The Risk Priority Number (RPN) was 
calculated. 
Results: Items with elevated RPN were presented in both centers. The highest RPN were in LAB1: “two request notes for a patient” and 
“the segregation of oncology urgent samples” (both with 384), while in LAB2 was “the lack of information in patients with oral glucose 
overload test” (RPN 576). Considering the different steps in the preanalytical phase, LAB1 paid attention in sampling, samples reception 
and the programming in the Laboratory Information System, while LAB2 paid attention in the request form, the appointment system, 
sampling procedures, transport and reception.
Conclusion: The laboratories prioritized the problems differently. However, both centers offer solutions to these possible sources of error. 
We proposed improvement actions that can be resolved easily, with a low cost for the system, mainly to schedule a specific formative 
programme and a deep revision of the existing protocols.
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Introduction
Although the presence of errors in the healthcare 
environment is a perfectly known risk both by pa-
tients and professionals, its existence implies the 
need to take into consideration actions for achiev-
ing the principle “primus non nocere” and avoiding 
harmful situations for the population (1). 
In our country, the prevalence of adverse effects in 
primary care centers (PCC) was explained in the 
Patient Safety in Primary Health Care Study (in 
Spanish), which addressed patient safety in Span-
ish primary health care facilities and described 
that every 9.6 visits of 1000 will produce an ad-
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verse effect on the patient in PCC attention, al-
though its degree of seriousness will be low (2).
On the other hand, the presence of errors in the 
preanalytical phase has been a widely studied 
topic in recent years. Several strategies have been 
developed as research lines, and actions have 
been set up in order to minimize the impact of 
these errors, studying their importance in different 
areas of the preanalytical phase in and out of the 
laboratory (3-8).
It is highly important to consider that the lack of 
detection or the misdetection of these errors can 
cause a potential risk, leading to misdiagnosis or 
wrong assessment in the patients’ follow-up. 
These errors could become serious, so their cor-
rect management is essential. Thus, the utilization 
of procedures that lead us to use diverse method-
ology is necessary, combining the detection of er-
rors and the searching of the possible sources that 
may allow planning both preventive and correc-
tive actions. In this sense, clinical laboratories have 
been characterized by an innovative profile that 
pursues the quality of their products introducing 
concepts such as quality control, quality assur-
ance, or quality management (9).
Although the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) was first applied by the aerospace industry 
in the 1960s, and is usually employed in the analy-
sis of a product or process, this method is valid for 
any kind of process or situation (10). Its adaptation 
to healthcare, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (HFMEA), was done by the US Veteran 
Health Administration and the Joint Commission 
on the Accreditation of Health Care at the end of 
the 1990s (11).
In this way, several studies have used the HFMEA 
as a useful tool to identify potential sources of er-
rors and their possible causes and to take action to 
prevent them in the preanalytical phase with the 
previously stated aim (12,13).
In addition, although this aspect is not much de-
veloped in the literature, the role played by nurses 
and auxiliary staff is relevant, but they are not usu-
ally included in these studies. Despite this, it must 
be noted that nurses are in charge of the biologi-
cal samples collection procedure, right in the heart 
of the preanalytical phase, and the auxiliary and 
support staff are key in its development. Several 
works have verified the importance of this role, in-
sisting on the need of improvement in samples 
identification or in specific training, not always ob-
taining good results, although the relevance of 
this role has in fact been made evident as for the 
improvement of the patient safety (14-16).
The previously mentioned studies that used HFMEA 
have been performed in regional hospitals of our 
public healthcare system which have specific char-
acteristics that could lead to a better control of the 
external factors such as the distance from the col-
lection to the delivery point of samples (10,11).
In the current study, the results of two HFMEA are 
presented, developed in laboratories from our 
health regional system that receive samples from 
PCC and that are located at a greater distance from 
the sampling points. In addition, they include oth-
er considerations that might imply the relevance 
of a procedure of these characteristics.
Therefore, we hypothesized that obtaining data 
from those involved in the preanalytical phase 
could provide complete and useful information to 
develop improvement programs that can help en-
hance the detection of errors, decreasing their 
number.
Thus, the aim of this study is to improve the ability 
to identify error sources with the use of HFMEA as 
a tool during the preanalytical phase in samples 
from the PCC that arrive at the laboratories of two 
tertiary hospitals.
Materials and methods
Study design
We performed a descriptive study by means a 
HFMEA with the determination of the Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) of every item. The study was per-
formed between April and October 2016.
Participants
We included data obtained from two laboratories 
of the Andalusian public healthcare system: Virgen 
de la Victoria (Málaga, LAB1) and Juan Ramón 
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Jiménez (Huelva, LAB2). Both centers receive sam-
ples from PCC to their areas, and both have a simi-
lar structure in preanalytical and samples recep-
tion areas.
LAB1 processes approximately 890,000 blood and 
urine samples yearly provided by PCC, and LAB2 
receives 580,000 (data from 2015). Both laborato-
ries receive samples from PCC located at a similar 
distance, use similar transportation and refrigera-
tion means, and also have the same sample recep-
tion areas structure. The difference between sam-
ples is due to the different population of the areas 
(population in the province of Malaga is larger 
than in Huelva).
The first step was, by means of the analysis of the 
process of study and a brainstorm by our research 
team, to develop a scheme based on the preanalyti-
cal phase in which the different steps of the process 
where errors could appear were described. This 
scheme included six key areas that might be con-
sidered potential error sources in the preanalytical 
phase: analytical request and request form, ap-
pointment system, patient preparation, sampling, 
transport, and reception - preparation of samples. 
Then, we summoned the participants in order to 
proceed as has been previously described.
A group of professionals was set up, including two 
nurses (from PCC and laboratories), two laboratory 
technicians, two support staff and three doctors (2 
analysts and 1 general practitioner), who were in-
formed in detail of the purpose of the study and 
the methodology to use. Each group was coordi-
nated by a member of the research team (in LAB1, 
the coordinator of the group was a clinical chem-
ist, while in LAB2 the coordinator was a laboratory 
specialized nurse).
Data presentation
Every participant was invited to comment on rele-
vant aspects about the possible error sources they 
identified, following the order of the previously de-
signed scheme, and they were asked to give a score 
from 1 to 10 for the severity rate (SR) and the occur-
rence rate (OR), being in both cases 10 the indicator 
of maximum rate, and to score the detection rate 
(DR), that values the capacity of being detected, 
with an inverse scale (higher probability of detec-
tion, lower numerical value). The RPN was calculat-
ed by multiplying the three data resulting (SR x OR x 
DR = RPN), then following a Pareto chart (17).
Once the possible errors were detected in the pro-
cess, the participants were asked to offer solutions 
to the problems, opening a debate that sought 
the adoption of agreement proposals, which were 
finally noted down. We encouraged the partici-
pants to describe only error sources.
Results
The analysis of the preanalytical phase, as we pre-
viously stated, revealed six sub-processes: analyti-
cal request and request form, appointment sys-
tem, patient preparation, sampling, transport, and 
reception - preparation of samples. As  it was de-
scribed in the Materials and methods section, we 
encouraged the participants to describe only the 
error sources. So as to better understand the pro-
cess, the area in which it is located, described 
above, is included between brackets next to each 
possible error source.
In LAB1, 24 potential errors were detected: 15 out 
of the laboratory facilities, and 9 within the same.
The highest RPN was 384 for two potential errors 
sources (existence of two request notes for a pa-
tient [analytical request and request form] and the 
segregation of urgent samples from the oncology 
service [reception - preparation of samples]). The 
most commented effect was the delay in process-
ing samples or non-performance of the tests re-
quested.
In LAB2, 16 potential errors were detected, 12 of 
them out of the laboratory facilities. The most 
commented aspect was the need to request a new 
sample. The highest RPN was 576, and it was given 
to the lack of information in patients with oral glu-
cose overload test (patient preparation).
The actions proposed are focused on the revision 
of protocols, the improvement of the organization 
charts and the widening of information by means 
of establishing or improving communication ways 
and developing specific training programmes. All 
data are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
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Element / Function* Failure Mode Effect RPN Proposed actions
Paper Analysis 
Request (1)
Bad quality request form
Incorrect completion
Bar code identification not read
Sample not processed 60
96
Specific training
Bar code identification on the 
back of the forms
Analysis Request with 
Electronic form (1)
Request not approved or authorised 
analysis
Mistakes in request form
It might be done 
not approved or 
unauthorised analysis  
or correct test might be 
rejected
118 Information circuits improvement
Correcting lack of information
Revision of filters in Electronic 
form generation
Laboratory 
Information System 
data input (1)
Not activation of patient request 
form (bar code not read)
Sample not processed 32
Only in paper request form: two 
petitions one patient (double 
request form, one by General 
Practitioner, one by Clinical 
Specialist)
Sample not processed 
(overlap request)
384 Protocols dissemination 
improvement. Surveillance of 
sampling
Lack of information or request not 
legible
Sample not processed 32
Mistake in patients demographic 
data
Sample not processed 32
Delay in scanning paper forms Delay in testing 36
Appointment (2) Misinformation to patients (fasting 
time, medication, etc.)
Error in fasting time or 
any other preparation
108 Patient information improvement
Preparation control in the 
Electronic form generation
Error in urine samples which needs 
previous preparation
Bad or erroneous test 64 Preparation control in the 
Electronic form generation
Containers delivery follow-up
Sampling (4) Double utilization of labels Electronic form: change 
bar code
Paper request form: 
Sample rejected
6
18
Early detection
Label/sample identification does 
not match
New sample 210 Potentially serious error. Extreme 
identification control
Wrong test tube Sample not processed. 
New sample
16 Special tests obtained only in 
Laboratory Sampling Room
Bad quality in samples Sample not processed 
(risk of misdiagnosis)
90 Improving training
Incorrect patient identification Sample processing 
error
180 Positive patient identification
Transport  (5) Delay Bad quality of samples 
(new sample)
49 Redesigning collection and 
delivery routes
Cold chain break Bad quality of samples 
(new sample)
72 Extreme control of devices
Loss of samples New sample 16
Delivery at the wrong destination Delay in samples 
processing
Samples not processed
8 Increasing information
Table 1. Healthcare Failure Modal Effects Analysis data from Hospital Universitario Virgen de la Victoria Laboratory (LAB1)
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Element / Function* Failure Mode Effect RPN Proposed actions
Samples receipt (6) Loss of sample tubes Sample not processed 81 Improving delivery area control
Bad centrifugation of samples Samples not processed 81 Improving delivery area control
Error in decantation or cold chain Incomplete analysis or 
sample not processed
192 Coordination between delivery 
area and administrative section
Aliquoting (6) Not enough samples Not processed. Gives 
error MI
200 Information Coordination in/at AP
Oncology urgent samples 
segregation
Delay in the reports 
generation
384 Protocols improvement and 
information enhancing
*Parts of preanalytical phase: (1) Analytical request and request form; (2) Appointment system; (3) Patient preparation; (4) Sampling;
(5)Transport; (6) Reception and samples preparation.*RPN - Risk Priority Number.
Element / Function Failure Mode Effect RPN* Proposed actions
Analysis Request with 
Electronic form (1)
Bad quality request form
Incorrect completion
Bar code identification not read
New sample 36 Check printers and bar codes
Incidence notification
Paper Analysis 
Request (1)
Two patients with the same bar 
code
It is no possible to read the form
Relevant information not included 
(i.e. diuresis)
Possible  incorrect 
result assignation
Erroneous  test 
scheduling
Results will not be 
calculated
240
35
35
Redesign organisation
Increase training and awareness 
(video, etc.)
Patients preparation 
(3)
Misinformation to patients (fasting 
time, medication, etc.), usually in 
appointments made by “Salud 
Responde”†
Altered results 360 Coordination between PCC, 
laboratories and “Salud 
Responde”†
Sampling (4) No sample or inadequate tube
Tube without bar code
Bad sampling
Lack of patient information (glucose 
overload test)
New sample
Sample not 
processed
Altered results
27
27
576
Check list made by the driver 
before the samples collection from 
the PCC
Training
Protocols revision and update
Transport (5) Non-statutory Bridges
Delay from sampling to laboratory 
more than 2 h
Bad quality samples
Biological risk
Possible altered 
results
486
Statutory Bridges with time 
and temperature control and 
secondary container
Traceability sheets
Samples receipt (6) Loss of tubes
Bad centrifugation
Delivery at the wrong destination
New sample
Bad quality samples
Not necessary or 
inadequate test 
made
81
8
245
192
Complete  traceability follow-up
Ensure the periodical revision 
in pre-analytical material 
(centrifuges, etc.)
Training and protocols revision
Specimen identification at origin
*Parts of preanalytical phase: (1) Analytical request and request form; (2) Appointment system; (3) Patient preparation; (4) Sampling; 
(5) Transport; (6) Reception and samples preparation. †Telematic assistance given by the Andalusian Health Service, both by 
telephone and by electronic means. RPN - Risk Priority Number. PCC - primary care center.
Table 2. Healthcare Failure Modal Effects Analysis data from Hospital Universitario Juan Ramón Jiménez (LAB2)
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With reference to the content of the tables, there 
is a difference in the content of the ELEMENT / 
FUNCTION column between both aspects, as the 
data provided by the laboratories were not the 
same: the undetected problems were not report-
ed and, subsequently, not included, and some re-
sults can be observed in one of the laboratories 
and not in the other one.
Discussion
Risk management is an essential part of the quality 
culture in healthcare and necessarily implies a 
deep involvement of the professionals. In this 
sense, the HFMEA has proven to be, for years and 
in several fields, a reliable tool for the detection of 
possible error sources in structured systems, per-
forming proactive risk management, an early iden-
tification of the causes of errors, and then, facilitat-
ing corrective actions (18,19). In this sense, the val-
ue of RPN helps prioritize procedures and strate-
gies against the errors sources detected (10).
The results obtained in both centers have more 
similarities than differences, although it is neces-
sary to specify that these differences may give 
greater value to the study due to the different 
characteristics of the corrective actions and the 
different approaches they require.
In particular, LAB1 considered as the most impor-
tant errors those detected in the implementation 
of a new procedure (urgent oncology samples ob-
tained in PCC) and the existence of duplicate re-
quests, doubtlessly due to the novelty of the pro-
cess and the communication errors detected in its 
implementation. In addition, LAB1 also considered 
factors such as the co-existence of general practi-
tioner and specialist requests (both RPN 384) to-
gether with the lack of coincidence between the 
patients’ identification data and the labelled sam-
ples (RPN 210) and the existence of insufficient 
samples that prevent errors when aliquoting a 
sample (RPN 200). On its part, LAB2 highlighted 
the deficit of information given to the patient re-
cipient of an oral overload of glucose (RPN 576), 
the delay in the transport of the samples to the 
laboratory (RPN 486), and the possible existence of 
the same code for two different patients (RPN 
240). The rest of the data were very similar in both 
centers.
It is necessary to point out findings such as differ-
ent RPN compared with other studies previously 
published made in our work environment (12). The 
reason might be that the participants declared 
high levels of error detection (that is, low detec-
tion rate), so this, doubtlessly, decreased the val-
ues of the parameter.
Although most error sources may be detected, a 
risk of misdetection still exists, as we previously 
commented. This situation forces us to plan strate-
gies and actions that allow us to manage this 
problem as better as possible.
The data obtained from the HFMEA are very simi-
lar to those from the SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, 
Opportunities, and Threats) analysis previously 
performed by our team (19,20). Thus, we have to 
keep in mind that asking professionals has proved 
to be a useful practice, as could be seen when 
asked to give their opinions. This information pro-
vides enhancement strategies as it comes directly 
from those involved in the studied process. In this 
sense, the suggestions made by the laboratory 
staff were mainly focused on scheduling a specific 
training programme and also a deep revision of 
the existing protocols, which are relatively easy 
suggestions to perform. This is why we drafted a 
detailed report for the management team with in-
structions to carry out a detailed planning of ac-
tivities in the near future.
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